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DOW JONES & CO. v. GUTNICK: WILL AUSTRALIA'S
LONG JURISDICTIONAL REACH CHILL INTERNET
SPEECH WORLD-WIDE?
Nathan W. Garnettt
Abstract: In December of 2002, the High Court of Australia issued its decision in
Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, holding that Dow Jones could be haled into court in
Australia for the publication of defamatory material on the Internet. This decision was
surprising because the material in question was published in the United States on Dow
Jones's New Jersey web servers. This decision makes Australia the only country that
allows an action against a foreign defendant based solely on an Internet download in that
country. However, the structure of the Gutnick opinion may open the door for other
countries to follow the High Court's example.
The Gutnick decision raises concerns that the territorial borders of speech protection
could break down in the Internet Age. Laws regarding the balance between free speech
and the protection of reputation vary widely among nations. However, the Australian
court ignored the implications that the breakdown of the borders between jurisdictions
could have on this balance, and instead mechanically applied historical precedent to the
Internet. This strict application to the Internet of precedent created for off-line
publication may produce a chilling effect on Internet speech worldwide by reducing the
level of speech protection on the Internet to the lowest common denominator. The
Gutnick decision's narrow focus on precedent does not offer sufficient protection to
international free speech, and the Australian Parliament should adopt a jurisdictional rule
to protect Internet speakers that do not aim their speech at Australia.
I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 2002, the High Court of Australia issued a landmark
decision regarding jurisdiction for cases arising out of information published
on the Internet.' In Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, the High Court held that
Australian courts have jurisdiction over a claim of defamation based on
material that was placed on the Internet outside of Australian borders. z This
decision is unique because no other country has allowed jurisdiction over
t The author would like to thank Professor Jane Winn and the Editorial Staff of the Pacific Rim Law
& Policy Journal.
' Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutmick, [2002] H.C.A. 56. Please note that, as the Bluebook has not been
updated to reflect the Australian High Court's new medium-neutral citation format, citations to recent
Australian cases will use a modified version of the citation format suggested by the High Court. This
format is (parties) [year of decision] (Court abbreviation) (sequential judgment number), (pinpoint cite to
paragraph number). See The High Court of Australia, Paragraph Numbers in High Court of Australia
Judgments and the use of Medium-neutral Citations, at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high ct/medium.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).2 See Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 48.
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extra-territorial parties based solely on content downloaded from the
Internet.
3
The Gutnick decision raised a great deal of concern around the world.4
The decision was of great interest to many in the global legal community,
both because the decision is contrary to traditional notions of sovereignty
and jurisdiction, and also because the reasoning of the Australian High Court
is based on precedent that many other countries follow. 5 The courts of other
common law countries may find that their shared precedents leave them no
choice but to reach similar holdings in similar cases.6 As a result, Internet
publishers who operate strictly within their own territory could be subject to
lawsuits all over the world. There is concern that such publishers would
face great difficulty defending these suits, and given the differing levels of
free speech throughout the world, that this could result in a chilling effect on
Internet speech.7
This Comment discusses the background of the Gutnick case, the
High Court's reasoning, and the possible consequences for international
Internet publishers. This Comment argues that the ruling is overbroad and
does not take sufficient consideration of international Internet policy
considerations. This Comment also suggests a potential solution to the
problems raised by this lack of consideration. Part II provides some factual
background and examines the Gutnick opinion. Part III compares free
speech laws in different nations and discusses the potential problems that
differences in such laws could raise if suits under Gutnick become
widespread. Part IV compares the old common law rule regarding the place
3 A Blow to Online Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,2002, atA34.
4 A search on the ALLNEWS database of WestNews showed 151 articles worldwide mentioning
the Gutnick case during December of 2002. The case also gathered a lot of attention before the decision
was issued. The following eighteen international media companies intervened with the High Court on
behalf of Dow Jones: Amazon.com, Associated Press, Association of Alternative Newsweeklies,
Bloomberg, CNN, Guardian Newspapers, Knight Ridder, Media/Professional Insurance, The New York
Times, News Corp. (Fox), Online News Association, Reuters Group, Time Inc., Tribune Company, The
Washington Post, Yahoo! Inc., Internet Industry Association, and John Fairfax Holdings Ltd. Transcript of
Oral Argument in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/hca/transcripts/2002/M3/2.htnl (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
Transcript of the Oral Argument]; see also Darrin Farrant, Media Giants To Log Into Gutnick Net Case,
THE AGE, May 29, 2002, 2002 WL 19622592; Katherine Towers, Media's Big Guns Try To Intervene In
Gutnick Case, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv., May 15, 2002, 2002 WL 21078355.
5 A Blow to Online Freedom, supra note 3, at A34; Clare Dyer, Ruling Could be Adopted by
English Courts, GUARDIAN, December 11, 2002, 2002 WL 103803815. One English lawyer was quoted as
saying, "I would certainly expect the same result here." Id. See also Long Arm of the Internet, GUARDIAN,
Dec. 16, 2002, 2002 WL 104291615.
6 Dyer, supra note 5.
7 Matthew Rose, Leading the News: Australia to Hear Web Libel Suit in Landmark Case, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 11, 2002, 2002 WL-WSJ 103128470; Michael Santoli, Down, Under. Ruling on Barron 's Article
Worries Internet Publishers, BARRONS, Dec. 16, 2002, 2002 WL-BARRONS 102498006.
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of publication and the newer American rule. The adoption of the American
rule in other common law countries has been suggested as a fix for the
potential free speech problems. Part V compares U.S. and Australian
jurisdictional rules and suggests that these differences may present another
solution. Part VI calls for Australia to adopt an "effects test" requirement
for jurisdiction in cases that arise out of Internet contact with the forum.
This Comment concludes with a call for respect for the jurisdictional and
speech laws of other countries when haling foreign citizens into court.
II. DISCUSSION OF Dow JONES & Co. v. GuTNICK
The High Court of Australia's decision in Dow Jones & Co. v.
Gutnick attracted a great deal of commentary around the world because it
created a unique rule that surprised many observers.8 However, much of this
commentary has failed to adequately examine the complexities of the
decision and the facts and law behind it. In the weeks after the ruling,
magazines and newspapers around the world printed hundreds of articles,
columns, and editorials on the decision.9 Opinions on the decision ranged
from approval of the High Court's "obvious" rule1° to derision for the
shortsighted protectionism of the Australian "Kangaroo Court."1 However,
these commentaries give short shrift to a decision that, while troubling on a
policy level, is a logical - if perhaps overly mechanical - extension of
existing precedent. Close examination of the facts and opinion in Gutnick
reveals that this is a more complex and interesting decision than this
commentary would suggest.
A. Factual Background of Dow Jones v. Gutnick
The factual background of the Gutnick case explains how the
heretofore unaddressed issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant
based on Internet contact arose, and suggests how the issue might arise in
the future. The defendant in Gutnick did not aim its allegedly defamatory
statements at Australia, the forum in which it was sued. However, the reach
8 Please note that the High Court's decision is merely a ruling on Dow Jones's attempt to stay or
dismiss the case. As of the writing of this Corment, the case has not yet gone to trial on the merits.
' See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
'o Graham Young, Dow Jones v Gutnick: the Internet honeymoon is over. What's next?,
at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/2003/Jan03/Young.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003); see also Victor
Keegan, The Web Needs Its Own Police, Dec. 19, 2002, THE GUARDIAN, 2002 WL 104293165.
See, e.g., Letters to the Editor: Free Speech Will Survive Kangaroo Court, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
2002 at A19.
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of the Internet makes a statement made in one country available around the
world. Because the statement was available in the plaintiffs home forum,
the Court held that the plaintiff has a tenable claim that his reputation was
damaged in that forum.'
The plaintiff in this case is Joseph "Diamond Joe" Gutnick, a
controversial and well-known Australian businessman and philanthropist.,
3
In October of 2000, Mr. Gutnick was the subject of an article in Barron's
magazine entitled "Unholy Gains: When Stock Promoters Cross Paths With
Religious Charities, Investors Had Best Be on Guard., 14 The article alleged
that Mr. Gutnick was using charities to artificially inflate the value of low-
priced stocks in the United States, resulting in profit for Mr. Gutnick and the
charities and loss for other investors.15 The article also asserted that Mr.
Gutnick had ties to other businessmen who had been convicted or charged
with fraud. 16  Mr. Gutnick, upset that he stood accused of fraud and
consorting with criminals, filed suit for defamation in his home state of
Victoria against Dow Jones & Co., the publisher of Barron 's.17
Dow Jones is a large media corporation based in New York that
specializes in business and financial reporting.18 Its media holdings include
Barron's and The Wall Street Journal.1 9 Dow Jones places the content of
many of its publications on the Internet on the Journal's website
(www.wsj.com), where the article at issue appeared on October 28, 2000. 20
Like many of Dow Jones's media outlets, Barron 's magazine is published in
the United States and is intended primarily for readers in the United States.
2 1
Barron's published an article in the United States about Mr. Gutnick, an
Australian citizen, because he stated that he intended to do more business in
the United States.2 Dow Jones uploaded the article to the website from
New York, and the digital information for the article was stored on the
2 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 44.
13 David Fickling & Stuart Millar, How Diamond Joe's Libel Case Could Change the Future of the
Internet, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 11, 2002, 2002 WL 103803955.
14 Bill Alpert, Unholy Gains: When Stock Promoters Cross Paths With Religious Charities, Investors
had Best be on Guard, BARRONS, Oct. 30, 2000, 2000 WL-BARRONS 28967054.
15 Id.
16 Id.
'7 See Gutnick v. Dow Jones, [2001] V.S.C. 305, 1-3 (Victorian S. Ct. 2001).
t See Dow Jones's homepage at http://www.dowjones.com/index aboutdow.htm (last visited Nov.
10, 2003).
19 Id.
20 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [20021 H.C.A. 56, 2.
21 The fact that only five copies of the edition of Barron's in which "Unholy Gains" appeared were
sold in Victoria is evidence that Victoria is not a major market for Barron's. Id. para. 97.
22 Alpert, supra note 14.
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company's web servers in New Jersey.23 Viewers of www.wsj.com must
pay a subscriber fee to view the site's material and while the site has a few
paying subscribers in Australia, it is not aimed at that market.24
After Mr. Gutnick sued, Dow Jones made a conditional appearance in
the Supreme Court of Victoria 25 to contest jurisdiction or to transfer venue to
New Jersey.26 Dow Jones argued that the case should be heard in New
Jersey, and New Jersey law applied, because that was the place of
publication.27 Mr. Gutnick responded that Victoria was the appropriate
forum and source of law.28 The basis for Gutnick's argument was common
law precedent that every observation of a defamatory statement creates a
separate publication, and thus a separate tort occurs in each place that the
statement is observed. 29 Agreeing with Mr. Gutnick, the Supreme Court of
Victoria reasoned that the publication of the allegedly defamatory article had
occurred in Victoria when it was downloaded there. 30 The court further held
that, because the alleged injury had occurred upon publication in Victoria,
Victoria was not an inconvenient forum.31 Dow Jones then appealed the
case to the High Court of Australia after the Court of Appeal of Victoria
refused to hear an appeal.32
B. The Australian High Court's Ruling
The High Court of Australia unanimously upheld the lower court's
decision and issued a majority opinion signed by four of the seven justices.3 3
The majority focused its discussion on the issue of where the allegedly
23 Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 17.
24 There are approximately 1,700 Australian subscribers to www.wsj.con, 300 of whom are from the
State of Victoria, out of a total subscription base of 550,000. Id. para. 169; see also Transcript of the Oral
Argument, supra note 4.
23 The Supreme Court of Victoria is the trial court in Joseph Gutnick's home state.
26 Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 7.
27 Id. para. 20.
2 Id. para. 6.
29 Id. para. 27.
30 See Gutnick v. Dow Jones, [2001] V.S.C. 305.
3' Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 7.
32 Id. para. 8. The Court of Appeal is the highest court in Victoria, and the High Court of Australia
is the highest legal authority in Australia.
33 The High Court of Australia has seven members. High Court of Australia, History of the High
Court, at www.hcourt.gov.au/about_02.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). Although the Court was formerly
below the privy counsel in England, it has been the highest authority in Australian law since the passage of
the Australia Acts in the 1980s. Id. See also Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 142. It should be noted that cases
from England, and other common law countries, are still given weight by the Australian courts. See Dyer,
supra note 5. The majority opinion was signed by Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices McHugh, Gummow,
and Hayne. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 1. Separate concurrences were written by Justice Gaudron, id.
para. 56; Justice Kirby, id. para. 66; and Justice Callinan, id. para. 168.
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defamatory material had been published.34  This issue is important under
common law because the place of the tort is often the most appropriate place
to hear the case.35 Historically, the place of "publication" is the place where
the statement is read or heard.36 The Court mechanically applied this
precedent to the facts of this case, and found that publication occurred where
the material was read, even though it was downloaded from servers on the
other side of the world.3 7 In coming to this decision, the Court considered
the precedent relating to print and broadcast publishing and, while it
examined the inherent differences between these methods of publication and
the Internet, it declined to change the common law rule based on these
differences.38
These inherent differences between the Internet and older forms of
media formed the basis of Dow Jones's unsuccessful argument.39  Dow
Jones argued that the Internet is a unique, international medium, and that it is
necessary for a single rule to apply, regardless of location.40 Dow Jones
further claimed that publishers need certainty as to the applicable law, and
therefore, the Court should apply the law of the home forum, unless the
publisher had located there for purely "adventitious or opportunistic"
reasons.4 1 The Court dismissed this argument as unconvincing.42 It stated
that the proposed "adventitious or opportunistic" standard was too vague to
be practical.43 The court also found that the policy concerns of a publisher
needing certainty about the law to be applied do not outweigh the concerns
of the potential plaintiff needing a convenient forum.44
Although many commentators have chastised the Court for its
perfunctory dismissal of Dow Jones's policy argument, these commentators
have often missed some of the underlying reasons behind this decision.
Americans are accustomed to the United States Supreme Court "making"
new law, often based on policy or sociological arguments. 45  However,
Australian courts, like some of the other common-law countries, seem far
14 Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 4.
35 Id. para. 44.
36 id.
37 See id. para. 71.
38 id.
39 Id. para. 18-24.
40 Id. para. 19.
41 Id. para. 20.
42 id.
43 Id. para. 21.
4 Id. para. 22.
45 This has long been the case in American jurisprudence and can be seen in such notable examples
as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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less likely to be swayed by purely policy-based arguments.46 Therefore,
Dow Jones's policy argument may have been doomed from the start.
Similarly, the Australian High Court seems to have less power than its
American counterpart to radically change the law.47 In his concurrence,
Justice Kirby concluded that the outcome of the case was a "result contrary
to intuition, 48 and stated that he felt called to reform the rule. 49 However,
Justice Kirby found that because of the High Court's traditional deference to
the legislature, he lacked the authority to make a new rule for the Internet.
50
Also not to be overlooked is the fact that Dow Jones was an American
defendant arguing for the application of American law in an Australian
Court. Justice Callinan noted that fact, and in his concurrence called Dow
Jones's argument an attempt to impose American "legal hegemony" on the
rest of the world .
After considering and rejecting Dow Jones's policy argument, the
High Court addressed precedent relating to the "place of publication" in
defamation suits. 2  Australian precedent states that the place where
defamatory material is "comprehended" is the place of the tort.53 Applying
this rule to the new facts present on the Internet, the Court articulated the
following rule:
In the case of material on the World Wide Web, it is not
available in comprehensible form until downloaded on to the
computer of a person who has used a web browser to pull the
material from the web server. It is where that person
downloads the material that the damage to reputation may be
done. Ordinarily then, that will be the place where the tort of
defamation is committed.54
46 For an interesting look at how the methods used by Australian courts are changing, including the
use of policy considerations in decision-making, see Justice Kirby's speech, Judging: Reflections On The
Moment Of Decision, available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_charles.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2003). Despite Justice Kirby's adherence to "new" methods of decision-making, including
the use of policy considerations, in the Gutnick decision even he was unwilling to change the law to reflect
the technological and societal changes that have occurred since the Duke of Brunswick precedent was
created in Dickensian England. See Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 66 (Kirby, J., concurring).
" Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 166 & 76.
48 Id. para. 164.
49 Id. para. 9 1.
so Id. para. 166.
51 Id. para. 200.
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Under this rule, the tort occurred in Victoria, where the material was
downloaded and thus viewed. Accordingly, Victoria was the place of the
damages claimed by Mr. Gutnick and the Court thus found that Victorian
law should apply.5" Having found that Victoria was the place of the tort and
the proper source of law, the Court found that there was no reason to find
that Victoria is a "clearly inappropriate forum," such that it should stay or
dismiss the proceedings. 
6
III. POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THE GUTNICK DECISION ON INTERNET SPEECH
WORLDWIDE
Much of the High Court's opinion in Gutnick is based on concerns for
Australian citizens who could be exposed to foreign speech, but the Court
failed to fully consider the negative effects that this decision could have
beyond Australia's borders. Nations place different premiums on free
speech, and as a result, have differing levels of protection for speech. Until
now, there has been little reason for concern about these differences because
speech and defamation laws, and their application, have been restricted to
their respective countries. The Internet, however, and decisions like
Gutnick, threaten to change this by extending these laws across borders in an
unpredictable way. Decisions like Gutnick could reduce the level of speech
protection to the lowest common denominator; the law of the country with
the lowest level of speech protection would become the de facto law of the
Internet.
A. The Rule Established in Gutnick Could Be Adopted Elsewhere
One of the biggest problems with the Gutnick decision is that is it not
likely to be restricted to Australia; the common law rule is that publication
of defamatory material occurs where it is read, a rule that is followed in
many common law countries. The Gutnick ruling is based on a logical,
though somewhat mechanical, application of this precedent to the new facts
of the Internet. A court in another common law country that follows the
same rule may reach the same conclusion. This rule originated in England,
where it is still followed, as it is in some other former English colonies.57
55 Id. para. 48. The international choice of law questions in this case also raise interesting issues
which, due to space constraints, will not be discussed in this Comment.
56 id.
57 See Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [2002] Q.B. 783, 813. In Loutchansky, the English
court reaffirmed the multiple publication rule established in Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 QB 185
(1849), which is the rule at issue in this case. English law is precedent in many former colonies, including
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This similarity in law may result in a similar ruling in the courts of these
countries if they are faced with a case like Gutnick 8 Evidence that this may
already be occurring can be seen in another defamation lawsuit against Dow
Jones, this one brought by Harrods Department Store in England. 9 Not only
is the Harrods case similar to Gutnick in that Dow Jones is a defendant, but
the case also involves a small number of hits at www.wsj.com. 6° This case
has also not yet come to trial, but the English court has ruled against Dow
Jones in its application for a stay on the ground of forum non conveniens.
6 1
A country need not follow the English common law tradition to adopt
a rule that a country has jurisdiction over material downloaded within its
borders. One of the factors considered by the High Court in Gutnick was the
concern that Australian citizens harmed by material on the Internet must
have a forum in which their complaints can be heard.62 This concern will be
present for any court, which may make this ruling attractive to other nations,
independent of common law precedent. In addition, many countries censor
the material that citizens may view on the Internet.63 These countries punish
those who view prohibited material, and it would be a small step to then rule
that the provider of the material is as culpable as the viewer. Gutnick has
legitimized this view, which will only be further strengthened if other
common law countries follow Australia's lead.
B. The Laws of Defamation and Free of Speech in Australia and the
United States Illustrate Significant and Potentially Problematic
Differences in Speech Protection Laws
There are substantial substantive differences between the law of free
speech and defamation in the United States and Australia, such that a
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the courts of which have not
overturned the holding in Duke of Brunswick.
58 English commentators have stated that the Gutnick decision would be "highly persuasive" in the
English courts because English courts regularly adopt "rulings from the courts of other common law
countries where no similar English case has reached the courts." Dyer, supra note 5. One English lawyer
was quoted as saying, "I would certainly expect the same result here." Id. See also Long Arn of the
Internet, supra note 5.
59 See Harrods Limited v. Dow Jones & Co., [2003] EWHC 1162 (Engl. 2003).
60 Id. para. 4.
61 Id. para. 36. For more background on this dispute, see Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd, 237 F.
Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd, 346 F.3d 357 (2nd Cir. 2003) (dismissing Dow Jones's suit for
declaratory judgment in New York).
62 Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 23.
63 See Peter J. Breckheimer II, A Haven For Hate: The Foreign And Domestic Implications Of
Protecting Internet Hate Speech Under The First Amendment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1493, 1508-09 (2002)
(describing the censorship of the Internet by China, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines, Thailand, and many Middle Eastern countries).
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publisher should be very concerned about which law is applied.64 Australian
defamation law is considerably more favorable to the plaintiff than that of
the United States.65 It is easier to win an action for defamation in Australia
because of the narrower privilege for statements made about "public figures"
and because the burden of proof is on the defendant instead of the plaintiff.
66
This difference in laws illustrates the difficulties faced by publishers who are
caught unaware by international conflicts of law. In the case of Gutnick,
Dow Jones published the article with defendant-friendly U.S. law in mind,
but must defend the article under plaintiff-friendly Australian law.
67
Part of the reason for the differences in speech laws between the
United States and Australia is the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.68  The First Amendment prohibits restrictions on freedom of
speech and U.S. courts have interpreted this prohibition very broadly. 69 The
other common law countries do not have an equivalent to the U.S. First
Amendment, and as a result, the common law relating to speech has
developed differently between those countries and the United States.7 °
The U.S. law of defamation significantly diverged from the common
law in 1964, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional
prohibition on laws abridging freedom of speech applies to the law of
defamation. 7 1 This decision was necessary to protect the right of the press to
" This is a fact about which the Justices of The High Court of Australia were quite aware. As
Justice Callinan stated during the oral argument, "the application of Australian law in New Jersey would be
quite repugnant to the freedom of speech rules in the United States." Transcript of the Oral Argument,
supra note 4.
65 Matt Collins, Defamation and the Internet after Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, at
http://www.mattcollins.com.au/Defamation%2 0and%20the%201nternet%/2after/2ODow/2OJones%20&
%20Company%2OInc%20v"/o20Gutnick.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). "Dow Jones was more likely to
win the substantive case if it proceeded in, or was determined in accordance with the law of, New York or
New Jersey." Id.
66 Sally Walker, Defamation Law Reform: The New South Wales Defamation Bill 1996 and the
Australian Capital Territory's Defamation Report, 5 TORTS L. J. (AustI.) 1, 3-4 (1997). See also, Matthew
Rose, Dow Jones Employee Appeals to U.N. in Libel Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2003, 2003 WL-WSJ
3964985. See also, RESTATEMENT (SE, JND) OF TORTS §613 (1977).
67 As of the writing of this Comment, this case has not yet come to trial. For an examination of some
of the defenses that Dow Jones may assert, see the trial court's ruling on motions to strike in Gumick v.
Dow Jones [2003] V.S.C. 79, 32-44 (Victorian S.Ct. 2003).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. This Amendment pertains to the freedom of religion, speech and press.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
69 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70 See, e.g., Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1187 (Can. 1995), in
which the Supreme Court of Canada found that the rule of Sullivan was a uniquely American rule, and was
not followed by the other common law countries.
71 See generally Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Division 5,
Special Note On The Impact Of The First Amendment Of The Constitution On The Law Of Defamation
(1977).
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criticize public officials. 2  During the civil rights struggle, there was a
concerted effort to curb criticism of public officials in the American South
through defamation suits.7 3 In the case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the
Court ruled that such suits unconstitutionally restrict freedom of speech.74
The Court held that it is fundamental to the American democratic system
"that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials., 75 As a result, when a
plaintiff who is a public official files a defamation suit in the United States,
he or she must meet a higher standard to prevail.76  In further rulings, the
Court has clarified that this privilege extends to cover any person who is a
"public figure," including politicians, celebrities, business persons, or
anyone else who is in the public eye. 77 These are persons who "have
assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society . . . [that]
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are• ,,78
deemed public figures for all purposes.
No other common law countries have followed Sullivan, though most
are starting to recognize some sort of public official privilege.79 The courts
of these nations often see Sullivan as a purely American rule that was the
result of an American law, and only required to fix an American problem.
80
However, the common law courts have begun to recognize that defamation
suits can stifle legitimate criticism of government officials and have
responded with various levels of protection for this criticism. 81  This
protection originated with a privilege for those who have criticized
72 See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND' THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1991).
71 Id. at 35.
74 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
75 Id. at 270. The Court held that a public official suing for defamation must show that an allegedly
defamatory remark relating to his official conduct was made with "actual malice", defined as "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. This
requirement was subsequently extended to defamation suits brought by "public figures." Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,453 (1976).
76 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
77 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
78 id.
79 See generally Andrew T. Kenyon, Defamation and Critique: Political Speech and New York
Times v. Sullivan in Australia and England, 25 MELB. U. L. REv. 522 (2001).
go See Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1180 (Can. 1995). On the
other hand, at least one U.S. court has found that the defamation rules of England, which are the basis for
the rules of the other common law countries, are "repugnant" to U.S. public policy. Matusevitch v.
Telnikoff, 877 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.C. 1995).
81 See generally Kenyon, supra note 79.
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government officials. 82 The defendant may only claim this privilege where
the statement is about a politician performing official duties. The courts in
England and New Zealand have recently recognized increased public figure
exceptions that extend past mere public officials.84  Australia has thus far
refused to follow England and New Zealand, and as of this time the privilege
only applies to criticism of government officials.8 5
Another important distinction between the law of defamation in the
United States and Australia is the burden of proof. In the United States, the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the statement was defamatory
and false.86 In addition, where the plaintiff is a public figure, he or she must
show that there was malice by a standard of "clear and convincing"
evidence. 7 In contrast, Australian law requires that the defendant prove that
the material was true.88 Because the burden is shifted to the defendant in
Australian law, it will be much easier for the plaintiff to prevail.89
82 See generally Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times, 182 C.L.R. 104 (Austl. 1994). See also
Kenyon, supra note 79, at 538-540.
s3 See Kenyon, supra note 79, at 538-40; see also Transcript of the Oral Argument, supra note 4.4 John Burrows, Review: Media Law, 2002 N.Z. LAW. REV. 217; see also Lange v. Atkinson [2000]
3 N.Z.L.R. 385; see also Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1999] 4 All ER 609 (Eng.). "In England,
however, the same defenses are available to publishers whether the claimant is a public or private figure,
although it may be easier for publishers to satisfy the 'public interest' criterion required to make out a
defense of qualified privilege or fair comment when the subject is a public figure. When public figures are
claimants, however, they need cross no higher threshold than do private people to make out their case."
Maryann McMahon, Defamation Claims in Europe: A Survey of the Legal Armory, COMM. LAW., Winter
2002, at 24. See also, Michael Gillooly, Lange v. Atkinson: An Australian Perspective, 2000 N.Z. L. REV.
401 (2000).
85 Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., [1997] 145 A.L.R. 96 (Austl. 1997); see generally Kenyon,
supra note 79. See also the Supreme Court of Victoria's ruling on motions in Gutmick v. Dow Jones [2003]
V.S.C. 79, 32-44 (Victorian S.Ct. 2003).
86 Restatement of Torts §613 reads as follows:
(1) In an action for defamation the plaintiff has the burden of proving, when the issue is
properly raised,
(a) the defamatory character of the communication,
(b) its publication by the defendant,
(c) its application to the plaintiff,
(d) the recipient's understanding of its defamatory meaning,
(e) the recipient's understanding of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff
(f) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication,
(g) the defendant's negligence, reckless disregard or knowledge regarding the truth or
falsity and the defamatory character of the communication, and
(h) the abuse of a conditional privilege.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §613 (1977).
87 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
88 See Walker, supra note 66, at 3-4. See also Rose, supra note 66.
See Rose, supra note 66. See also, Victorian Wrongs Act of 1958, No. 3807 § 11. Trial for
Defamatory Libel (updated through 2003), available at
http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/12dfW/ACT01282/8_0.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
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The result of these differences is that in the United States, where Dow
Jones placed "Unholy Gains" on its web servers, Dow Jones would be
almost certain to prevail in a defamation suit, but in Australia it may well
lose. In the United States, Joseph Gutnick would be considered a public
figure subject to the privilege, while in Australia he is not. In the United
States, Gutnick would have the burden of showing that the material was
false, and because he is a public figure, he would also have the burden of
showing that Dow Jones had "actual malice" in publishing the false
information.9" However, when Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co. comes to trial
in Victoria, Dow Jones will have the burden of proving that the material was
true.9 1 Dow Jones was free to criticize this famous businessman in the
location where the article was uploaded but not in the place where it was
downloaded. If a publisher must consider the law in all the places where its
material can be downloaded, the ability of nations to provide added
protection for speech is negated. Given that Australia lags behind many of
the other common law countries in speech protection, this should be a
concern for Internet publishers all over the world.
92
C. There Is No International Consensus on the Proper Balance Between
Protecting and Regulating Speech
The international differences in free speech protection are certainly
not limited to the differences between U.S. and Australian law. As Justice
Kirby noted in his concurrence in Gutnick, the rest of the world "does not
share the American, as others see it, obsession with free speech., 93 This
disparity in views leads to varying levels of protection of speech and varying
methods of dealing with speech that is deemed unacceptable. Some
countries have very low protection for speech, and many make certain
speech a criminal matter. In addition, many repressive governments
90 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
91 See Rose, supra note 66. "[U]nder Australian libel law, defendants have to prove the truth of the
allegations in question, whereas in the U.S., plaintiffs have to prove that the allegations are both untrue and
a result of some falsehood or error."
92 This case also raises interesting questions about how U.S. courts would rule on attempts to enforce
judgments under Gutnick in collateral actions in the United States. For reasons of space, this issue is not
addressed in this paper. For some examples of how U.S. courts have treated the judgments of other
countries when those judgments do not meet U.S. standards for speech protection, see Yahoo! Inc. v. La
Ligue Contre Le Racism et LAntisemitisme, 169 F.Supp.2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Matusevitch v.
Telnikoff, 877 F.Supp. 1 (D.C. 1995); and Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661
(N.Y. 1992). See also, Linda Silberman, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in
the United States, 670 PLIILit 429 (2002).
93 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4.
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aggressively prosecute anyone making statements critical of the
government.94
The varying level of speech protection among nations is evidenced by
the vague language of the article protecting free speech in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 95 Although Article 19 states that
speech should be protected, it also allows exceptions for "respect of the
rights or reputations of others," and "for the protection of national security
or of public order, or of public health or morals. 96 As one might expect, the
lack of specificity in the languafe results in many different interpretations of
what restrictions are allowed.9 For example, Canada allows prosecution
94 The repressive government of Zimbabwe recently illustrated the dangers of combining low speech
protection with jurisdiction over the Internet. Geoffrey Robertson, Mugabe Versus the Internet, THE
GUARDIAN, June 17, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4435071,00.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2003). The government of President Mugabe arrested Andrew Meldumm, an American journalist working
as the Zimbabwe correspondent for the British newspaper The Guardian. Id. Mr. Meldrum's reports were
critical of President Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF party. Id. Under new media laws propounded in
January of 2002, Mr. Meldrum was charged with publishing falsehoods. Id. This case would not be
extraordinary in a repressive country like Zimbabwe, except for the fact that The Guardian is not available
in print in Zimbabwe. The offending article was published on The Guardian's website and downloaded by
a Zimbabwean intelligence officer in Harare. Id. The material was posted on the intemet in London, and
aside from the fact that it was written by a correspondent based in Zimbabwe, the article had no contact
with the forum. Id. The prosecution of Mr. Meldrum was widely criticized. Id. Mr. Meldrum was
eventually acquitted when it was shown to the court's satisfaction that Internet material is "pulled" from the
publishing source rather than being "pushed" like radio or television. Id.
95 The text of Article 19 is as follows:
I. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
Jonathan Zittrain, an assistant law professor at Harvard Law School, said it is unlikely that Australian libel
law "would fall below the floor" set by the U.N. Commission. Rose, supra note 7.
9' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 95.
9' The author of the article at issue, Bill Alpert, has "filed a plea with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, in Geneva, alleging Australia's violation of Mr. Alpert's right to free
speech under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Press Release,
William Alpert and Dow Jones & Co., Alpert vs Australia: Barron's writer challenges the decision of the
High Court of Australia over Gutnick case (April 15, 2003), available at
http://www.dowjones.com/news-aboutDJ/AlpertvsAus.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). Mr. Alpert said:
"I am filing this action with the Human Rights Commission in Geneva because I fear restrictions on the
ability of financial journalists such as myself to report truthfully to United States investors on the activities
of foreigners who are actively engaged in the U.S. markets. I even fear for our ability to report on U.S.
corporations and business people, who might see the High Court's decision as an invitation to attack the
U.S. press in a remote forun. Given the differences between the laws of Australia and those of other
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for, and censorship of, statements that it deems "hate speech." 98 Many civil
code countries have even lower standards of speech protection, and often
treat defamation as a criminal matter.99 In France, defamation is "any
allegation or imputation of a fact that bears upon or attacks the honor or
standing of a person" and bad faith on the part of the publisher is
presumed.10 0  The low level of speech protection is not limited to
defamation; France also has criminal penalties for insulting the French
president.101
D. Free Speech Could be Chilled If Speakers are Uncertain About Which
Legal Standard Will Apply to Their Speech
The combination of rules that allow application of laws to
extraterritorial defendants with varying levels of international speech
protection can lower the bar for speech protection for the citizens of all other
countries. If an American writer must consider the laws of Australia when
publishing, his or her level of speech protection is reduced to that of
Australia. This restricts the ability of the American government to
encourage frank public speech. As Dow Jones's general counsel stated, "[i]t
countries in the Commonwealth and beyond, the impact of Australia's law -- as laid out by the High Court -
- could harm journalists throughout the world. Powerful and sophisticated plaintiffs could search out
overseas jurisdictions willing to help stifle news coverage that was only directed at local readers in those
journalists' home markets." Id. Though sections 1 and 2 of Article 19 might seem to favor Mr. Alpert, the
limitations in section 3 probably preclude a favorable outcome. See International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 95; see also Anita Ramasastry, Should the U.N. Intervene in a Transnational
Internet Defamation Case?: An American Journalist Sued in Australia Files a Petition Seeking Help,
FINDLAW, May 7, 2003, http://writ.fmdlaw.com/ramasastry/200
3 0507.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
98 Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can. 1990). See also, Rights Tribunal Says it Can Shut
Down Web Sites, KITCHENER-WATERLOO REcORD, Jan. 19, 2002, available at WL 10721119.
99 Report of the Law Commission on Defamation and the Internet (Eng.), Dec. 2002, at
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/defamation2.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). See also Anita Ramasastry,
Can Europe Block Racist Websites from its Borders? And If So, Will Hatemongers Seek the U.S. 's
Technological Asylum?, FINDLAW, Feb. 05, 2003, at http://writ.f'mdlaw.com/ramasastry/2003020
5
.hml
(last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
'00 "Defamation claims in France are governed by the criminal law and by the law of 29 July 1881,
which is an annex to the French Criminal Code. Libel is defined by Article 29 of the law of 1881 as 'any
allegation or imputation of a fact that bears upon or attacks the honor or standing of a person.' Bad faith by
the publisher is presumed. This definition applies to all defamation offenses." McMahon, supra note 84, at
29-30.
10 See Jo Johnson, British Tabloid Risks Fine For Attack on Chirac, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, 2003
WL 14177599. The British tabloid The Sun published a special edition in Paris insulting French President
Jacques Chirac. There was concern that the French government might press charges against The Sun for
defaming the president. The Sun purposely entered into French territory to pique the French leader and
perhaps hoped to provoke such a response from French authorities. However, if French courts were to
adopt a Gutnick-style rule, those who similarly insulted the French leader on the Intemet could face
prosecution if they were ever to fall into the grasp of French courts.
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creates a kind of tyranny of the lowest common denominator and
inhibit[s] free speech."' 0 2
The chilling effect on speech could result both from the threat of
being haled into court across the globe, with the resultant burdens, as well as
the actual lower standards for speech protection. Dow Jones has the ability
to defend a suit in Australia, but a smaller publisher may not. A publisher
will be forced to think twice about publishing a statement that might result in
the burden and expense of defending a suit on the other side of the world, or
in losing a default judgment there. As a result, Gutnick places the Internet's
utility as a form of mass communication at risk.
10 3
The High Court's response to this argument is that "in all except the
most unusual of cases, identifying the person about whom material is to be
published will readily identify the defamation law to which the person may
resort."' ° However, this is not a satisfactory answer to this problem. Dow
Jones reports on financial matters of publicly traded companies, and as such
it fills an important role in American public life. Even if the information
about Joseph Gutnick were mere speculation, Dow Jones felt that it was
important enough to the American public that the information should be
disseminated. Under the High Court's reasoning, the American public's
need to know information about business taking place in the United States is
subservient to Australia's speech laws. Justice Callinan called Dow Jones's
argument an attempt to impose "American legal hegemony" 105 on Australia,
but he failed to recognize that his opinion imposes Australian legal
hegemony on the publishers of the rest of the world.
IV. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS THAT GUTNICK RAISES IS
TO CHANGE THE OLD COMMON LAW PRECEDENT ON DEFAMATION
"PUBLICATION" TO THE NEWER AMERICAN RULE
Given that the Australian High Court was aware of the implications
that its decision could have outside its borders, it at first seems surprising
that the Court ruled as it did. The issue in this case, however, was not only
:02 Rose, supra note 7.
103 "The really disturbing aspect of the decision is that if upheld and widely followed, it could render
the Internet useless as a form of mass communication," said David Schulz, a partner in the New York
office of Clifford Chance. "Publishers will inevitably tend toward censorship, and people will be unwilling
to use the Internet because of civil and criminal liability." Brenda Sandburg, Australian Court Ruling
Could Extend Reach of Libel Law, THE RECORDER, Dec. 2002, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1039054429946 (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
04 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 54; see also Rose supra note 7.
'0' Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A 56, 200.
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one of policy; the Court based the Gutnick decision on well-established
common law precedent regarding where "publication" occurs in a
defamation case.' 0 6  Dow Jones and many commentators have suggested
changing this rule to the more recent American rule.'0 7 However, courts in
the common law countries have been very reluctant to make this change.
The following sections explain the different rules for determining the place
of publication, how the American rule avoids the problems of Gutnick, and
why changing the common law rule may not be a viable solution.
A. The Common Law Multiple Publication (Duke of Brunswick) Rule
At the heart of the holding in Gutnick is an extension to the Internet of
an old English common law defamation rule on "publication. ' 08 This rule,
established in the 1849 English case of Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, is
called the multiple publication rule.'09 The English common law of
defamation has been based on this rule for the past 150 years and most of the
other common law countries, including Australia, continue to follow it. 10
The multiple publication rule in Australia is as follows:
[T]here is a separate publication (and thus a separate cause of
action) in relation to each copy delivered to a reader. If a
newspaper circulates 100,000 copies of the one edition
(defamatory of the plaintiff), he has available to him at least
100,000 causes of action. The "single publication" rule adopted
in the United States, whereby a plaintiff is given only one cause
of action for each entire edition of the newspaper, has not been
adopted in this country.I"l
'06 Id. at 27; see also Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2002] Q.B. 783, 813 (Eng. 2002).
107 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4.
t' Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 128, citing Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 QB 185 (Eng. 1849).
109 See, generally, Duke of Brunswick, 14 QB 185. In this case, the Duke of Brunswick purposely
sent one of his employees to read the allegedly defamatory material in the archives of a newspaper,
knowing that it was there. He thus was able to restart the tolling of the statute of limitations, which had
long ago run on the seventeen year-old article. The Queen's Court ruled that each new reading of
defamatory material creates a new "publication" and thus a new cause of action. It is this ruling that forms
the basis for the defamation law of most of the common law countries. See Loutchansky, [2002] Q.B. 783,
813, citing Duke of Brunswick, 14 Q.B. 185). ("It is a well established principle of English law of
defamation that each individual publication of a libel gives rise to a separate cause of action. ). See
also Kenyon, supra note 79.
"o Glouchkov v. Michaels, [2001] I.L.Pr. 21, 288 (Eng. 2001), at 2000 WL 544123.
' Harris v Perkins, [2001] NSWSC 258 (New South Wales S.Ct. 2001). See also David Syme &
Co. LTD v. Grey, (1992) 115 A.L.R. 247(Austl. 1992).
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Under the multiple publication rule, each observation of a statement
creates a separate cause of action. The result is that every observation of a
statement resets the clock on a statute of limitations, and creates a new
location in which an action may be brought. The original Duke of
Brunswick case arose from the observation in a newspaper archive of an
article that was almost two decades old.112 The English court held that the
original statute of limitations had run, but that a new cause of action was
created when the article was read again.1 3 This rule has been expanded as
new media have emerged, and has been held to apply to books, movies,
radio, television, and now, the Internet.14
B. The American Single Publication Rule
Courts in the United States long ago diverged from the other common
law countries and have universally rejected the multiple publication rule.' 15
Instead, the United States follows the single publication rule, which states
that any edition of a book, newspaper, radio, or television broadcast is a
"single publication" for which only one action for damages can be
maintained." 6  Courts began adopting the single publication rule in the
nineteenth century because of the problems that the multiple publication rule
caused when applied to statutes of limitations.1 17 It has been expanded to
deal with determination of the place of publication as well as the time. As
stated in the Restatement of Torts § 577A, the rule is as follows:
112 Duke of Brunswick, 14 QB 185.
33 id.
"' Dow Jones & Co. v. Gulnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 38.
11 For a full examination of the single publication rule see Debra R. Cohen, The Single Publication
Rule: One Action, Not One Law, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 921 (1996).
116 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977). This rule has been long
established in U.S. common law. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Sprague, 5 N.E. 144, 145 (Mass. 1886); Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co. 107 S.W. 496, 500 (Mo. 1907). The Uniform Single Publication Act was first
published in 1952 and quickly adopted in many states. One example of a statute based on the Uniform
Single Publication Act can be found at CAL. CrV; CODE § 3425.3, which reads:
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or slander or
invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication or exhibition or
utterance, such as any one issue of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one
presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one
exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for any
such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
117 Because every comprehension of a defamatory statement creates a new cause of action under the
multiple publication rule, there is essentially no statute of limitations for defamation. Every time someone
new reads the material, the statute of limitations begins to toll again, with the practical effect that there is
no time limit on a suit for defamation. Courts in the United States did not think that this was practical or
fair and invented the single publication rule in response. See supra note 116, and accompanying text.
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(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio
or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or
similar aggregate communication is a single publication.
(4) As to any single publication,
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be
recovered in the one action; and
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the
merits of any action for damages bars any other
action for damages between the same parties in all
jurisdictions. 1 8
As a consequence, in the United States, if defamatory material is only
published once, an injured party may only bring one suit. The proper venue
for the suit will be the place of the tort, which can be the location where the
material was printed or the place of sale.1 9 Whether the publisher has
intentionally disseminated the statement at the place of publication will be
the key factor when deciding if venue is proper in a U.S. defamation suit.
20
As types of media and methods of publication have expanded and
increased, American courts have expanded the single publication rule to
cover them.121 It is therefore likely that U.S. courts will extend the rule to
the Internet. Indeed, several courts have already held so. The first such
decision was in Firth v. New York, 122 in which a New York state court stated
that there is no "rational basis upon which to distinguish publication of a
book or report through traditional printed media and publication through
electronic means ... ,123
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A.
119 The question of where a "single publication rule" case could be brought was settled by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In Keeton, the plaintiff sued Hustler
Magazine in New Hampshire because the New Hampshire statute of limitations for defamation was longer
than any other state, and had not yet run. Hustler Magazine, Inc. is an Ohio company, which does not print
in New Hampshire. Its only contact with the state was the shipment of between 10,000 to 15,000 copies of
its magazine into the state. The Supreme Court held that this was sufficient contact with the forum state to
allow jurisdiction. The number of magazines and the intentional nature of Hustler's distribution in the state
meant that allowing jurisdiction would not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 780-81 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
120 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
121 See Firth v. New York, 706 N.Y.S.2d 835 (NY Ct. Cl. 2000), aff'd., 731 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div.
2001), affd., 747 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2002).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 843. In Firth, the court rejected the ruling in an unpublished decision by the Court of
Appeals of Tennessee in Swafford v. Memphis Individual Practice Assn., No. 02A01-9612-CV-00311,
1998 WL 281935 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 2, 1998). Swafford held that every time a database was accessed, a
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C. Courts in Common Law Countries are Unlikely to Adopt the Single
Publication Rule "Fix"
The adoption of the single publication rule would solve the problems
raised by Gutnick, but courts in common law countries have been very
reluctant to do so. 124 If the single publication rule is applied, the place of
publication is generally the location where the publisher writes or uploads
the material. 125 The single publication rule gives publishers certainty about
the law that will govern their material because, unlike the old common law
rule, it does not emphasize the place of comprehension. However,
Australia's High Court has specifically rejected the single publication rule in
Gutnick and earlier cases, and seems unlikely to reconsider this decision.
12 6
In addition, the multiple publication rule seems appropriate in a society
where the balance between protection of speech and reputation has been
decided in favor of protection of reputation. Also, other common law
countries, whose rulings have some persuasive authority in Australia, have
repeatedly decided against adoption of the single publication rule.
127
Because the multiple publication rule is so entrenched in Australian law, the
answer to maintaining adequate protection of Internet speech may lie
elsewhere.
V. DIFFERENCES IN THE RULES OF JURISDICTION AND VENUE BETWEEN
AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES SUGGEST ANOTHER POSSIBLE
SOLUTION TO THE GUTNICK PROBLEM
Although media analysis of the Gutnick opinion focused on the
multiple publication rule, divergent jurisdictional rules may have had an
equally important impact on Gutnick's outcome, and may hold the key to
solving the problems raised by the ruling. The laws governing jurisdiction
and venue in Australia and the United States at first seem very similar, but
new publication occurred. While not technically a rejection of the single publication rule in the Internet
context, it had essentially the same effect. The Firth court held that the publication was the placement of
the information online, and specifically stated that the single publication rule applies to information on the
Internet. Firth, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 841. Firth has since been endorsed by the District of Kentucky in Mitan v.
Davis, 243 F. Supp. 2d 719 (W.D. Ky. 2003), and cited favorably by the Southern District of New York in
Van Buskirk v. The New York Times, No. 99 Civ. 4265(MBM), 2000 WL 1206732 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,
2000), and Cuccioli v. Jekyll & Hyde Neue Metropol Bremen Theater Produktion Gmbh & Co., 150 F.
Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
124 See, e.g., Glouchkov v. Michaels, [2001] I.L.Pr. 21, 288 (Engl. 2001), at 2000 WL 544123.
125 See, e.g. Firth, 706 N.Y.S.2d 835.
12 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 44.
127 See, e.g., Glouchkov, [2001] I.L.Pr. 21, 288.
VOL. 13 No. I
DOWJONES & CO. v. GUTNICK
are actually quite different. If a lawsuit arising out of Internet contact with
the forum is brought under U.S. law, the court is likely to find a lack of
jurisdiction and dismiss the case immediately. However, Australia has a
different set of rules, and this difference in approach to jurisdiction over a
defendant helps explain why this case seems so outrageous to most
Americans, but also suggests a possible solution.
A. Jurisdiction and Venue in Australia
Under Australian law, a court may only exercise jurisdiction in a case
if the legislature has provided a statutory grant of authority to the court. 28
In the State of Victoria, where Mr. Gutnick brought his action, the law
giving the court power over an extraterritorial defendant is found in Rule 7
of the Victorian Supreme Court's rules of civil procedure. 29  More
specifically, jurisdiction was based on Rule 7.01, which allows service on a
defendant outside of Australia where, under subsection (i), "the proceeding
is founded on a tort committed within Victoria" or under subsection (0), "the
proceeding is brought in respect of damage suffered wholly or partly in
Victoria and caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring.
130
The fact that a defendant does not have assets in the forum and has very
minimal contacts with the forum131 is "irrelevant once the propounded long
arm rule is found valid and applicable.' 32 This is a substantial distinction
from the American rule. 133
The more important consideration when ruling on a motion to dismiss
in Australia is lack of proper venue, a difficult standard for the defendant to
meet under recent changes to Australian law. 134  Venue is defined as the
128 See, e.g., Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic), 6 (Service) and 7 (Service
out of Australia), http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/12d/S/STAT00687/3 4.htsnl (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).129 Victorian Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 128, rr7.01(1)(i), 7.01(1)0) and 7.05(2)(b),
http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/12d/S/STAT00687/3 4.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
130 Id.
131 In his concurrence, Justice Kirby "infers" that Dow Jones has no assets in Australia, but that
inference is probably erroneous. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56 ,103. The Dow Jones website shows multiple
offices in Australia, including one in Melbourne, which is in the State of Victoria. See Dow Jones website,
http://www.newstoprofitby.com/showpage.cftn?pid=84 (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). As Justice Kirby
notes, however, this is not a relevant factor in Australia, and thus has no effect one way or the other on the
ruling of the case. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 103.
32 Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 101. Justice Kirby notes that even the United States allows for long
arm jurisdiction. Id. The point that he misses is that a court in the United States may only use its long arm
jurisdiction if there are sufficient minimum contacts. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
133 The American rule requires minimum contacts with the forum in addition to a valid statute.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
134 See generally Richard Gamett, Stay Of Proceedings In Australia: A 'Clearly Inappropriate' Test?,
23 MELB. U. L. REV. 30 (1999).
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proper place to bring an action.135  The standard for dismissal for lack of
venue in Australia requires a finding of a "clearly inappropriate forum,'
136
which is a departure from the prior common law rule of forum non
conveniens' 37 which is still followed in England and many other common
law countries.' 38  The Australian standard is very high, and will only be
satisfied if it can be shown that the forum is "clearl], inappropriate" "for the
determination of the dispute between the parties."'13  This standard contains
a balance of multiple factors: the law to be applied, the place of the acts, and
the residences of the parties are all considered. The defendant can also
prevail if it shows that the forum would be "oppressive and vexatious.'
140
This test is also a departure from common law precedent in that the
availability of another more appropriate forum will not be dispositive.
4 1
However, the defendant's lack of contacts with the forum will not be
dispositive either.
142
B. Jurisdiction and Venue in the United States
One of the primary requirements for bringing a suit in a U.S. court is
that the court must have jurisdiction, or "power" over the defendant. 143 This
power usually comes from a statute in the state in which the court sits.'"
Typically, a state will have a "long arm statute" that allows jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant. 45 When asked to assert such jurisdiction, courts
"' See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (7th ed. 1999).
136 See generally Garnett, supra note 134.
137 See Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Consulex Ltd [1987] 1 A.C. 460 (Austl. 1987). This rule requires
that, "in the case of service outside the jurisdiction, ... before the court would agree to hear the case, it
had to be persuaded ... that the action or the defendant had some territorial or other connection with the
forum." Garnett, supra note 134, at 31-32. It is important for U.S. readers to note that the concept of forum
non conveniens differs between the U.S. and other common law countries. The Doctrine of Personal
Jurisdiction established in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), and refined by International Shoe
and its predecessors is based on the Fifth Amendment. It is thus a creature somewhat unique to the United
States. The English common law doctrine of forum non conveniens includes factors that would fall under
both personal jurisdiction and venue considerations in the United States. Thus, the U.S. concept of forum
non conveniens is much more limited than the concept as it exists in other common law countries.
... Spiliada Maritime, [1987] 1 AC 460; see Gamett, supra note 134.
"9 Garnett, supra note 134, at 33, 136 (quoting Oceanic Sun Lines, [19881 165 C.L.R. 197, 243
(Austl. 1988)).
14o Id. See also, David Rolph, The Message, Not the Medium: Defamation, Publication and the
Internet in Dow Jones & Co Inc v. Gutnick, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 263, 278 (2002) (citing Voth v. Manildra
Flour Mills, 171 CLR 538, 554 (Austl. 1990)).
141 Id.
142 id.
143 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 855 (7th ed. 1999).
'4 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.020 (2003).
45 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (2003).
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in the United States have long required that the defendant in a case have
actual contacts with the forum.146 The old standard required actual physical
presence by the defendant in the jurisdiction for exercise of jurisdiction. 147
The standard has evolved, and the requirement is now that the defendant
must have "minimum contacts" with the forum, "such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."" 4 8 These minimum contacts are required by the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
4 9
Courts in the United States have been considering how to apply these
traditional rules to Internet contact for several years, but have yet to
articulate a standard rule. In a 1996 ruling similar to Gutnick, a federal court
in Connecticut found that an advertisement on the Internet that was viewed
in Connecticut was sufficient to confer jurisdiction in that state. 150 No other
court has gone this far, and since that time, courts have been less likely to
find jurisdiction over Internet-based extrajurisdictional defendants. 151 In
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,152 the Western District of
Pennsylvania created a test that linked the likelihood of jurisdiction for
Internet contact to "the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the
exchange of information that occurs on the web site."'15 3 Since Zippo, courts
have often broadened this test to include an inquiry into the defendant's
activity, especially if the activity has an effect in the forum, or "constitutes
'availment' of opportunities in the forum state."' 54  One of the broadest
readings has been in the Sixth Circuit case of Neogen v. Neo Gen
Screening,'55 in which the court allowed jurisdiction based solely on
commercial Internet transactions between the plaintiff and the out-of-state
defendant.156 Many courts have begun to follow the Calder v. Jones "effects
test," which allows jurisdiction if the defendant purposely aimed the speech
at the forum and knew that the speech would have a significant impact in the
forum.' 57 Courts in the United States are still far from articulating a rule that
146 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
47 Id.
1'8 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
149 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
:50 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
1 See Digital Control Inc. v. Boretronics Inc., 161 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1186 (W.D.Wash. 2001).
52 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
53 Id. (citing Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992)).
154 RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 591 (2002).
'" Neogen v. Neo Gen Screening, 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2002).
156 It is worth noting that Neo Gen might be distinguished from the Gutnick case because in Neo Gen
the defendant was shipping physical items to the forum after the Internet transactions, which might create
more "contact" in the mind of a U.S. court.
157 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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covers all the possible permutations jurisdiction for online activity, but all of
the decisions have required some affirmative contact with the forum by the
defendant. 15 8
A plaintiff in the United States must also satisfy the requirements for
proper venue, but this standard is less important under U.S. law.' 59 Venue is
governed by statute, and because a case involving an extraterritorial
defendant would likely be brought in federal court,1 60 a plaintiff would have
to meet the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.161 Section 1391 states that proper
venue lies where the defendant resides, where a substantial portion of the
case occurred, or if the case can be brought in no other district, where
jurisdiction is proper.' 62 Because venue is usually proper at some location in
the United States, a foreign defendant is unlikely to win a motion to dismiss
for lack of venue if a court has found that jurisdiction is proper.' 63
C. Australia's Lack of a Minimum Contacts Requirement Makes the
Gutnick Ruling Overbroad
The Gutnick ruling is overbroad because it fails to consider its effect
on publishers that have no contacts or connection with the forum. Although
the reasoning of the Gutnick decision is troubling, it is not particularly
unreasonable that Dow Jones would be haled into court in Australia, because
it does have offices in Australia and it did sell subscriptions there.
1 64
However, because the Court did not actually consider contacts with the
forum, it failed to distinguish between those defendants that have availed
themselves of Australia, and hence may be able to defend in Australia, and
those that have never benefited in any way from contact with Australia.
'58 For more information on Intemet Jurisdiction see JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW
OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 3 (4th ed. 2003).
159 "The distinction must be clearly understood between jurisdiction, which is the power to
adjudicate, and venue, which relates to the place where judicial authority may be exercised and is intended
for the convenience of the litigants. It is possible for jurisdiction to exist though venue in a particular
district is improper, and it is possible for a suit to be brought in the appropriate venue though it must be
dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42, 257 (5th
ed. 1994).
'60 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2003) states that U.S. federal courts have original jurisdiction in a case
involving "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."
161 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2003).
162 At the federal level, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Jurisdiction is governed by the long-
arm statute of the state in which the federal court sits. Arrowsmith v. United Press Intern., 320 F.2d 219,
223-224 (C.A.Vt. 1963); see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1075 (3P ed. 2003).
16' 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2003).
'64 See discussion in footnote 131.
VOL. 13 No. I
DOWJONES & Co. v. GUTNICK
Thus, it is possible that a much more sympathetic defendant than Dow Jones
may soon find itself sued in Australia.
Although, as the discussion in Part V(B) demonstrates, it is difficult to
know how a U.S. court would rule in a situation involving an Internet
defendant that did not have physical or economic contacts with a forum, it is
certain that the court would closely examine the defendant's relationship
with that forum. This examination would include inspection of the extent to
which the defendant had contacts with the forum, and whether such contacts
were of such nature that it would be fair to force the defendant to defend in
that forum. 65  It is this analysis that is missing in Gutnick. If this
hypothetical defendant were sued in Australia, the court would need only
find that the material was observed in Australia, and that observation would
be sufficient to permit the suit to proceed.
The most troubling potential application of the Gutnick ruling is the
effect it could have on a free Internet service lacking physical contacts with
the forum. In such a case, a publisher might offer material on the Internet
for free, with no physical presence in Australia, and without targeting the
Australian market. Although such a publisher would have no contacts with
Australia, it could still be sued for a statement made about someone with a
reputation in Australia. Thus far, no country other than Australia has law
that would allow jurisdiction in such a case. This case would be dismissed
in the United States because the assertion of jurisdiction over a party with no
contacts would violate due process. 166
An Australian court that follows Gutnick would allow such a
defendant to be sued in Australia. It is this hypothetical scenario that truly
illustrates the over-breadth of the Gutnick ruling. The High Court held that
the mere viewing of information on the Internet created an instance of
publication at the time and place of that viewing. 167 It does not matter
whether that information was purchased or if the publisher targeted the
forum. Thus, the publisher of free material would be just as susceptible to
be haled into court as the publisher who, like Dow Jones, collected money
from residents of the forum, and benefited from contacts with that forum.'
68
That this publisher would be haled into Australian court despite having no
reason to foresee such an action is the most serious problem with the
Gutnick decision.
165 See discussion in section V(B).
'66 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (holding that the due process clause of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires "minimum contacts" with the forum).
16' Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 44.
161 See discussion in footnote 24.
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VI. AUSTRALIA'S PARLIAMENT SHOULD ADOPT A JURISDICTIONAL
"EFFECTS TEST" REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNET CASES
The problems raised by Gutnick are not likely to go away. The
Internet is obviously here to stay, and as more and more people use it, the
risk of more decisions like Gutnick grows. This risk will soon be more than
theoretical, and may already be dampening speech. Given the issues raised
by the defendant, and recognized by Justice Kirby, the predominantly
negative world-wide reaction, and the fact that this ruling is out of step with
the rest of the world, it seems likely that Australia will need to revisit this
issue.
Because the High Court has already issued its decision, it is likely that
any solution to this problem will have to come from Australia's
Parliament. 169 Because this issue involves a balance between protecting the
individual rights of an extraterritorial defendant and the right to redress in
the courts for a domestic plaintiff, any solution will have to diminish one
right to satisfy the other. Australia's current solution gives all the weight to
the latter concern at the expense of the former; a better solution might be to
create a rule that addresses both concerns.
The question then becomes, "what should the rule be?" One potential
solution would be to adopt the single publication rule wholesale. This
option has already been rejected by Australian courts, 70 and given the long
entrenchment of the multiple publication rule in Australian law, this seems
unlikely. Another option would be to adopt the single publication rule only
for information on the Internet. This is an option being considered by the
English Law Commission. 17  However, this option is probably also
politically unsatisfactory in Australia, both because it fails to protect
Australian citizens' right to reputation and because it is intellectually
inconsistent to have one nle for one form of media and another for all
others. 72 Another alternative would be to adopt the rule proposed by Dow
Jones, that "the publisher of material on the World Wide Web be able to
govern its conduct according only to the law of the place where it
maintained its web servers, unless that place was merely adventitious or
'69 See Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 76 (discussing the High Court's traditional deference to the
Parliament in making new rules).
170 Id. at para. 27, citing Duke of Brunswick 14 QB 185. See also McLean v. David Syme & Co Ltd
72 SR (NSW) 513 at 519-20, 528 (Austl. 1970).
17 Report of the Law Commission on Defamation and the Internet, supra note 99.
72 See Firth v. New York, 706 N.Y.S 2d 835 (N.Y. 2000).
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opportunistic."'73 As the Australian High Court noted, this is a vague rule
that presents problems of interpretation.
Adoption of an American style "minimum contacts" requirement for
jurisdiction over international Internet defendants may be the solution that
would best address this issue. This is not a solution that can be found in
Australian precedents, but because any further action in this area will need to
be taken by Parliament, this should not be a barrier. This rule could be
based on the "effects test" created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Calder v.
Jones.'
75
In Calder v. Jones, The National Enquirer, a Florida corporation, its
publisher, and a reporter were sued in California. The National Enquirer is a
tabloid newspaper circulated nationwide, but California is its largest market,
accounting for about twelve percent of the copies sold. 176 The publisher and
reporter were not California residents and had limited contacts with that
state. The U.S. Supreme Court found that these defendants knew that the
story could have damaging impact on the plaintiff in the forum and the
defendants knew that the story would be widely distributed there. 177 The
Court thus held that purposely performing an action that the defendants
knew would have a large impact in the forum was sufficient contact with the
forum to assert jurisdiction. 178 This line of reasoning has been followed by
several U.S. courts when dealing with Internet jurisdiction, and it provides a
balance between fairness in jurisdiction to the defendant and fairness in
redress to the plaintiff.
179
An Australian rule based on the effects test might read as follows: an
action based on material placed on the Internet outside of Australian borders
may only be commenced where the publisher has sufficient contacts with the
forum or has taken affirmative steps to target the forum. This compromise
solution would provide redress for Australian plaintiffs in instances where
the publisher clearly intended to speak to an Australian audience and would
prevent publishers from relocating outside of Australia's borders to avoid
173 Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 20.
'"' Id. para. 21.
175 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
176 Id. at 785.
177 Id. at 789-90.
178 id.
179 See, e.g., Wagner v. Miskin, 2003 N.D. 69 (finding that there was jurisdiction over Internet
statements because the defendant's website, www.undnews.corn, was directed at the University of North
Dakota); see also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 123
S.Ct. 2092 (2003) (holding that Calder was an appropriate standard for an Internet libel case, but finding
that there was not jurisdiction over defendant because its Internet activity was not "expressly targeted at or
directed to the forum state").
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jurisdiction. This solution also allows Australia to keep the multiple
publication rule, and merely requires that Australia acknowledge that it is
not reasonable to hale a party into court when that party has no actual
contact with the forum. This idea is not foreign to Australian law, as it is a
consideration that already exists in the factors considered in the "clearly
inappropriate forum" test.'
80
This proposed rule does not have the ambiguity that exists in Dow
Jones's proposed "adventitious or opportunistic" test.181 An "effects test"
rule would still allow an Australian plaintiff to bring a suit if the defendant
intended Australia as an audience, but purposely operated offshore to avoid
liability. It would continue to allow a plaintiff to bring suit against
defendants, like Dow Jones, that have sufficient contacts with Australia such
that a publication could cause damage, but it would also prevent the most
egregious assertions of jurisdiction over defendants who have absolutely no
contact with the forum.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ruling in Gutnick is overbroad and presents a danger to
international free speech. Gutnick is based on precedent from a time when
international concerns were far less relevant, and as a result, it has the
potential to impose Australia's speech standards on the rest of the world.
Even more troubling is the possibility that other countries with even lower
free speech standards might follow Australia's lead. The fact that the
Australian High Court relied on long-established precedent does not obviate
the responsibility of the Australian government to act in response to the
problems that this ruling raises. Though chilling of speech may not yet have
occurred, and a publisher without physical or economic contacts with the
forum has not yet been haled into court, the potential for these problems
should not be ignored.
Australia is of course free to adopt whatever rules it feels are
necessary for the protection of the reputation of its people. However, in the
way that it has done so, Australia has expanded its jurisdictional boundaries
such that its rules infringe on the ability of other countries to protect their
own citizens. There is no problem if Australia wants to apply the multiple
publication rule when considering jurisdiction within its own borders, but
when it attempts to control the speech in other countries, we all should be
concerned.
0 See generally Garnett, supra note 134.
Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.C.A. 56, 20.
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It is important to respect the laws of other sovereign nations. The
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that it must "consider the procedural and
substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
assertion of jurisdiction by the .. .courts," 182 and "great care and reserve
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into
the international field."'183 Australia should heed these notions of respect for
the democratically chosen laws of other nations. Speakers should have the
right to rely on the laws of the forum in which they speak. As Dow Jones's
counsel argued, the law should "respect the fact that the substantive law by
which the publishers work is prima facie appropriate to judge whether their
work is at fault."'
' 84
The Internet has been called the "most participatory form of mass
speech yet developed."'' 85  It is a unique forum with which people may
bypass the traditional gatekeepers of mass communication. While it has
been said that "the First Amendment is a local ordinance in cyberspace,"'
8 6
this should not mean that that online speech is less protected. Because
Internet speech is every bit as valid and important as older forms of speech,
nations must ensure that it remains free and protected.
182 Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 155 (1987).
"' Id. (quoting U.S. v. First National Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965)).
184 Transcript of the Oral Argument, supra note 4.
185 Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
186 This statement is often attributed to John Perry Barlow, former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, and
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. See, e.g., The Seybold Report on Desktop Publishing,
July 17, 1995, 1995 WL 12561256.
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